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SUGAR POLICY REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
Recently, the Republic of Turkey passed a significant milestone on its road to becoming 
a full member of the European Union (EU). On January 1, 1996, the customs union agreement 
contained in Decision No. 1/95 and issued by the EC-Turkey Association Council became 
effective. The agreement eliminates barriers to trade between Turkey and the EU in industrial 
goods and processed agricultural products. In addition, Turkey has agreed to adopt the EU's 
Common External Tariff for trade with third countries and to align its domestic policies with 
the EU's common commercial policy (Customs Union, 1998). Turkey stands to gain between 
1.0 and 1.5 percent annual growth in its GOP as a result of the customs union in manufactured 
goods. The benefits from Turkey's customs union with the EU would increase if the 
agricultural sector were included (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr, 1996). However, until 
Turkey adopts domestic programs that are compatible with the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), trade in agricultural commodities will continue to be restricted (EC-Turkey Association 
Council, 1998). 
The process of harmonizing Turkey's domestic agricultural policy with the CAP has 
already begun in the sugar sector. In 1997 the Turkish Sugar Corporation (TSC) drafted a 
proposal to change Turkey's current sugar policies to coincide with the existing CAP. With the 
aid of a partial-equilibrium simulation model of Turkey's sugar industry, this paper examines 
the impact of the proposed sugar regulation on Turkey's sugar production and trade. As a 
policy alternative, we also analyze changes in Turkey's sugar sector resulting from a reduction 
of tariffs on sugar imports under the current domestic policy. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes 
Turkey's sugar sector and the development of sugar policy. We also look briefly at the 
proposed changes in Turkey's sugar policy and its consistency with the CAP. This discussion 
is followed by an outline of the econometric model and estimation results that form the basis for 
the simulation model. The third section presents the simulation results of the current proposal 
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for policy change, and the last section considers the impact of tariff reductions under the 
current pol icy. 
Historical Background of Turkey's Sugar Market 
Sugar beet production has been an important agricultural activity in Turkey since 1923 
when the first sugar factory was established in Usak. In 1926 only 6,664 Turkish farmers 
produced sugar beets; however, by the early 1990s the number of sugar beet farmers wa<; 
approaching 500,000 (OECD, 1994). Sugar beets are grown throughout Turkey, but the major 
production regions are Marmara, east-central, and south-central Turkey. Almost all beets are 
grown under contract with processing plants operated by the state-owned TSC or state-regulated 
Central Union of Sugar Beet Producer Cooperatives (PANKOBIRLIK). As part of the 
contract, the processor prescribes the optimal crop rotation for the region, sowing sugar beets 
on a field once every three or four years. Crop rotations commonly include wheat and other 
cereals, pulses, fodder crops, and sunflowers. Sugar beet planting begins as early as February 
and continues through May. The sugar beet harvest begins in late July and continues through 
November. 
The TSC and PANKOBIRLIK guarantee to buy all beets produced on the area specified 
in the contract. This policy guarantees farmers a market for their product. Consequently, 
farmers often prefer to produce beets even when the expected return may not be as high from 
other crops. In addition to eliminating marketing uncertainty, the TSC provides seeds and 
fertilizers to farmers as part of the production contract. Farmers must use the seeds provided 
by the processor, but they are free to purchase their own fertilizers from other sources. 
However, farmers generally prefer to purchase fertilizers from the processor because payment 
can be deducted from their proceeds after harvest. The disadvantage of delaying payment for 
inputs purchased from the processor is the high opportunity cost of the farmer's capital exacted 
by rapid int1ation, particularly since farmers generally do not receive their final payment until 
March or later. If needed, the TSC also provides harvesting equipment or custom harvest 
services. Farmers are responsible for providing the land, labor, and irrigation, and for 
transporting the beet<; from the farm to the designated collection point (Sarigedik, 1998). 
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When the Turkish Sugar Corporation was established in 1935, all processing of sugar 
beets was placed under the control of the state monopoly. Private sugar refiners have been 
established as part of the structural adjustment program initiated in 1980. Presently there are 
29 sugar refineries in Turkey, 24 of which are solely owned by the TSC. The remaining 
factories are jointly owned by the TSC in partnership with other entities. The majority shares 
of three jointly-owned refineries are held by PANKOBIRLIK, which operates these plants 
independently of the TSC. Each sugar refinery is assigned a geographical region in which it is 
free to contract with farmers for sugar beets. 
Since 1956 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has prepared sugar beet 
procurement and ex-factory sugar price suggestions for the government. Based on these 
suggested prices, the Turki~h government announces a sugar beet procurement price each fall 
after the harvest has begun. The producer price has been disclosed only twice before the 
harvest, in 1990 and again in 1996. The ex-factory price is set to account for expected 
production cost<; and is revised periodically throughout the year to adjust for inflation. Retail 
prices for sugar are allowed to fluctuate according to market conditions. 
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Turkey's current sugar policy is designed to insulate the domestic market from 
international price shocks and to ensure a stable sugar supply. Under this policy, Turkey is 
self-sufficient in sugar production. However, domestic prices are well above world prices, and 
imports are limited by a prohibitive tariff rate. Moreover, excess sugar production is exported 
with the aid of subsidies. Based on producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1994) has concluded that 
Turkey's sugar regime provides a transfer from consumers to producers. This transfer is more 
than 40 percent of the purchase price in some years. Likewise, Oren (1998) found that the 
effective protection coefficient for Turkish sugar beets is as high as 56.4 percent. The level of 
effective protection, like the producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, fluctuates from year 
to year as a consequence of Turkey's rapid inflation rate. The variation in effective protection 
can be quite large, ranging from -21.7 percent in 1989 to 56.4 percent in 1992. 
In the draft legislation proposed by the TSC, sugar beet producers would contract with 
sugar processors for a fixed quantity of ~ugar beets rather than for a production area. In other 
words, farmers will have production quotas. Farmers will be able to sell their contracted 
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quantity of sugar beets to the TSC at the support price announced by the government of 
Turkey. Purchase price adjustments will be made for farmers whose production falls short or 
exceeds the contracted amount. Processing plant<> operated hy PANKOBIRLIK will he required 
to follow the same pricing and contracting rules as state-owned refineries. Quota levels for 
individual farmers will be established as an average of their contracted production for the last 
three years. National production levels will be determined by tJ1e Sugar Committee, which will 
he composed of government officials representing industry, agriculture, finance, and trade, as 
well as representatives from PANKOBIRLIK and the Farmers Union (Sarigedik, 1998). 
While the specific provisions of Turkey's new policy may differ from the CAP sugar 
regime, the basic principles are essentially the same. The EU sugar regime is based on a 
sophisticated system of production quotas designed to ensure a stable supply of sugar and a 
"fair" return to sugar beet and cane producers. Production designated for domestic 
consumption is established by the A and B Quota levels. These quotas were originally set to 
meet existing sugar demand in member countries and expected future growth. Consequently, 
the regime was prone to overproduction from it<; inception, and excess sugar under the B Quota 
is exported with subsidies. The price for A Quota sugar is supported hy the white sugar 
intervention price. Producers supplying beets for A Quota sugar are paid a price that is derived 
from the sugar intervention price, taking into consideration the processing margin, yield of 
sugar from the beets, receipts from molasses, and the cost of transporting the beets to the 
refinery. The price for B Quota sugar is reduced by the levies that are collected to finance the 
cost of export subsidies needed to sell excess B Quota sugar on world markets. In this manner, 
the sugar regime is intended to be self-financing. C Quota sugar is excess sugar produced to 
ensure that the A and B quotas are met in the event of a shortfall. C sugar does not receive 
support under the CAP, and it is exported without subsidy (Harris and Tangermann, 1993). 
Turkey's proposed policy is consistent with the EU sugar regime in its establishment of 
production quotas and in the use of sugar and sugar beet support prices. At this point, it is 
unclear whether Turkey will follow the EU's multitiered quota system and what approach it will 
take toward the disposal of excess sugar. In the simulation analysis that follows, it was 
necessary to make assumptions regarding these and other uncertainties that have a significant 
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impact on the scenario outcomes. These assumptions are clearly delineated in the discussion of 
the simulation results. 
An Econometric Model of Turkey's Sugar Sector 
The CARD simulation model contains four components: sugar demand, supply, trade, 
and price relationships. In most cases these relationships are represented by equations 
estimated from historical data. Table 1 displays the estimated parameters and relevant 
validation statistics for the model equations. 
Consumer demand for refined sugar is specified as a function of per capita income and 
the average of the retail crystal and cube sugar prices. The homogeneity condition is imposed 
by dividing the price and income by the consumer price index (Alston et a!., 1998). Prices of 
complementary and substitute goods were omitted from the demand equation to maintain a 
parsimonious specification. It is difficult to discern clear substitutes and complementary goods 
for sugar; nevertheless, given the food consumption and dietary habits in Turkey, one may 
consider tea, flour, and vegetable oil the principal goods complementary with sugar 
consumption. However, the cost of modeling these additional goods was greater than the 
expected benefit gained from accounting for cross-price effects on sugar demand. 
Consequently, the influence of complementary goods on sugar consumption is approximated 
using a dummy variable to indicate when prices of complementary goods rise more rapidly than 
the sugar price. Historically, an inverse relationship has existed between Turkish sugar 
consumption and the change in the food price index relative to the sugar price. Sugar 
consumption declines when the food price index rises more rapidly than the sugar price, as it 
did during 1985 to 1988; thus, the dummy variable for this time period captures the negative 
impact of rising prices for complementary goods. 
Devadoss and Kropf (1996) provide a list of price and income elasticities for sugar 
demand in different countries. Their study did not include Turkey; nevertheless, the elasticities 
displayed in Table 2 can be compared with Devadoss and Kropfs Table 1 to assess the 
plausibility of our estimates. The own-price and income elasticities estimated in this study are 
0.14 and 0.49. Both values look reasonable when compared with elasticities for other 
developing countries. For example, sugar own-price and income elasticities for Asia reported 
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by Devadoss and Kropf are 0.12 and 0.41. Reported income elasticities for the European 
Union, United States, Indonesia, and Mexico are 0.30, 0.25, 1.25, and 0.25. 
On the supply side, sugar beet production is calculated as the product of area harvested 
and yield. Using this conversion factor, refined sugar production is derived from sugar beet 
production. The area response for sugar beets is specified as a function of sugar beet area three 
years earlier [t 3], lagged producer procurement price [t 1], the wheat producer price lagged 
three years [t 3], and a policy dummy. As mentioned earlier, farmers can produce sugar beets 
under the contract with TSC and PANKOBIRLIK. Every sugar beet production region is 
divided into three subregions, and farmers within a subregion can produce sugar beets on a 
three-year rotation. Wheat is the principal substitute crop for sugar beets because wheat is 
produced in every region of the country, while other substitute crops are produced only in some 
regions. Hence, the wheat price measures the impact of crop substitution in the sugar beet 
supply equation. Due to the lack of appropriate data, this sugar beet supply model specification 
does not include input prices as right-hand-side variables. The policy dummy variable captures 
the influence of the economic stabilization program introduced in April 1994 that continued 
until the end of 1995. The economic stabilization program affected both input and output 
prices, reduced subsidies, and adjusted terms of payment. 
Sugar beet yield is specified as a function of the lagged producer price [t 1], a time 
trend, and dummy variables indicating climatic conditions. The time trend was included to 
account for the impact of technological improvements on yield, such as high-yield variety 
seeds, irrigation, and advances in sowing and harvesting practices. Since the government 
procurement price is announced after sugar beet harvest, naive price expectations were 
considered appropriate for the yield model specification. 
Sugar beet supply response to changes in the producer procurement price is calculated 
a~ the sum of area and yield elasticities. In the short run our estimated supply response is 0.9. 
This value is comparable to sugar beet supply elasticities reported by Devadoss and Kropf 
(1996) for India (0.99) and Western Europe (0.71). As expected, the cross-price elasticity of 
sugar beet area with respect to the wheat price reported in Table 2 is smaller than the own-price 
response in both the short and long run. 
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Turkish sugar trade fluctuates in response to political concerns and the presence of 
excess sugar supplies in the domestic market rather than in response to international price 
movements. Consequently, net sugar exports are estimated as a positive function of lagged 
sugar stocks. A minimum stock level of 10 percent of the previous period's consumption is 
imposed in the simulation period. The ending stock of sugar is calculated a..<; the maximum of 
the difference between domestic consumption and total domestic supply and the minimum stock 
level. When the minimum stock constraint is binding, then net trade is derived residually from 
the domestic market balance. 
Data 
The data used in this study were obtained from two sources. Area, yield, production, 
prices, population, price indices, GDP, and GDP deflator were taken from publications issued 
by the State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry, Republic of Turkey (SIS). The source of 
consumption, export, import, and stock data is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
(MARA). Sugar consumption is disappearance consumption. Data obtained from the MARA 
are the same data series used by the OECD to calculate producer and consumer subsidy 
equivalents. The 1979-1993 series of consumption, export, import, and sugar production data 
are reported in the OECD country report for Turkey ( 1994). 
Baseline Results 
In order to analyze the impact of the proposed changes in Turkey's domestic sugar 
policy, it wa..<; necessary to construct a baseline under the existing policy regime. The estimated 
equations described earlier were used to project future values for the endogenous variables. 
Projections of macroeconomic variables were either assumed or taken from the projections 
published by the OECD or FAPRI. Table 3 provides a summary of the baseline assumptions 
for exogenous variables. 
The Turkish wheat price used in the sugar beet area equation was derived from F APRI 
projections ofthe U.S. Gulf price using a price transmission equation with an elasticity of 1.0. 
The domestic price for crystal sugar was derived from the average London spot price for 
refined sugar via a lagged-adjustment equation with a short-run price elasticity equation of 0. 78 
and a long-run elasticity of 1.0. Projections of the London spot price were calculated as a 
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I in ear function ofF APRI projections for the Caribbean raw sugar price. 1 Turkish retail prices 
for cube sugar and producer prices for sugar beets were generally assumed to increase 
proportionally to the crystal sugar price. Finally, the import tariff for refined sugar wa.<; 
reduced in equal increments from 1999 to 2004 and then held at the bound rate for the rest of 
the simulation period. The model was calibrated to 1997 sugar beet production, area, yield, 
and price data from SIS. Data from the most recent year were not available for other variables; 
consequently, equations calculating these variables were calibrated to 1995 or 1996 data. The 
baseline projections are presented in Table 4. 
In 1995 Turkey's sugar beet harvested area dropped nearly 25 percent below the 
previous year. In response the government increased the real price of sugar beets 43 percent; 
however, since the price was announced at harvest, the impact on area was delayed until 
planting season the following year. Uncharacteristically, the procurement price for sugar beets 
wa.<; announced at planting time in 1996, and though the nominal price nearly doubled, the real 
price for sugar beets actually declined slightly. Nevertheless, sugar beet area increased more 
than 35 percent. Real sugar beet procurement prices rose significant! y again in 1997, but area 
increased a mere 5 percent to reach 445 thousand hectares. The baseline projection for 1998 
has sugar beet area down slightly from 1997 due to the impact of reduced planting in 1995 on 
crop rotations. Sugar beet area will remain fairly stable until the impacts of falling real wheat 
prices begin to surface as increased sugar beet plantings after 2000. After the turn of the 
century, Turkey's sugar beet area increases at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent. Though 
yields fluctuate in response to real sugar beet price movements, the sugar beet yield averages 
0. 8 percent annual growth after 2000. Assuming a conversion rate of approximately 8.2 kg of 
sugar beets per kg of refined sugar, rising sugar beet area and yield implies a 26.5 percent 
increa.o;;e in refined sugar production by 2007. Sugar consumption increases 3.4 percent 
annually; however, growth in sugar supply is able to keep pace with consumer demand. 
Ending sugar stocks remain above 700 tmt for most of the projection period, and net exports 
average 238 tmt. With real sugar and sugar beet prices fairly stable throughout the projection 
period, changes in consumer and producer surplus mirror changes in quantities. 2 The cost of 
export subsidies to remove excess sugar from the domestic market increases in the short run. 
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The budgetary burden of the policy remains high after 2000, averaging 4.51 trillion Turkish 
Lira valued at 1996 prices ($55.5 million). 
Adoption of Turkey's New Sugar Policy 
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Two major adjustments must be made in the simulation model to accommodate the 
changes in Turkey's sugar policy embodied in the new legislation. First, we assume that 
Turkish procurement and ex-factory prices will adjust to the Turkish Lira equivalents of the EU 
intervention prices. Sugar intervention prices and sugar beet prices for 1998 are 631.9 ECU/mt 
and 47.67 ECU/mt. Based on observed historical relationships between the world sugar price 
movements and changes in EU policy prices, we assume that the sugar intervention price will 
decline to 618.8 ECU/mt in 1999 and remain at that level through 2001. From 2002 to 2005, 
the sugar intervention price is assumed to fall farther to 611.1 ECU/mt before rising to 613.9 
ECU /mt for the last two years of the simulation. The sugar beet intervention price is assumed 
to move with the sugar intervention price, reaching 46.68, 46.10, and 46.31 ECU/mt over the 
respective periods. 
Second, we establish production quota levels and a mechanism through which the quota 
influences producer decisions. The proposed sugar legislation stipulates that production 
contracts with farmers will be based on an average of their output over the last three years. 
The policy is designed, in part, to maintain domestic market equilibrium. Consequently, we 
establish the national production quota equal to average sugar production less net sugar trade 
over the last three years. Unlike the European Union, sugar consumption in Turkey is expected 
to continue to increase. Therefore, the production quota is allowed to grow 2.5 percent 
annually from 2001 onward. 
We anticipate that sugar beet producers will seek to grow enough beets to ensure they 
meet their quota each year, even when returns from growing other crops may be higher. The 
guarantee to purchase the farmer's full quota of sugar and the production and marketing 
assistance provided by the TSC are assumed to provide the incentives necessary to induce 
farmers to meet their quotas. Since yields are uncertain, they will plant additional hectares to 
cover the event that yields fall below expected levels. Thus, we specify sugar beet area under 
the quota system as equal to the maximum of the area generated by the equation in Table 1 and 
10 Ko9 and Fuller 
the amount of land necessary to satisfy the sugar quota given yields 5.5 percent below the five-
year moving average yield. 3 Since the sugar beet price under the new policy is lower than in 
the baseline, the sugar quota determines production area throughout the simulation period. 
Table 5 displays the simulation results under the new policy. In most years, harvested 
area under the new policy exceeds the baseline levels. This is largely due to the fact that the 
sugar beet yield falls below baseline level as a consequence of lower returns under the EU 
sugar beet intervention price. Thus, producers require more area to meet their sugar 
production quota. The national production quota lies between 2 and 13 percent below baseline 
production levels, so it is not surprising that production under the new policy is generally below 
the baseline. The EU sugar intervention price projection is slightly below the baseline price for 
crystal sugar. Accordingly, sugar consumption in the new regime is 0.1 to 0. 8 percent above 
the baseline. Higher consumption with lower production leads to declining stock levels and 
falling sugar exports. Turkey becomes a net importer in 2004 and continues to import small 
quantities of sugar for the remainder of the projection period. 
Welfare and government cost measures for the production quota and tariff reduction 
scenarios are presented in Table 6 along with the percentage change from the baseline levels. 
The direct government cost of the proposed sugar policy is lower than the current policy 
because fewer funds are required to subsidize exports of excess sugar production. Since 
Turkey is a net importer of sugar after 2003, Table 6 shows positive government revenues from 
tariff collections on imported sugar. However, if Turkey imports sugar from the European 
Union, no tariff revenue will be collected under the customs union. All other things equal, 
lower producer and consumer prices imply that producers are worse off and consumers better 
off under the proposed policy. In 2007 consumer surplus is 1. 7 percent above the baseline, but 
producer surplus is more than 40 percent below the baseline level. 
The simulation results indicate that if Turkey harmonizes its sugar policy with the EU's 
sugar regime, EU intervention prices may not provide sufficient revenue for Turkish farmers to 
maintain growth in sugar beet yields. As a consequence, significantly more area is planted to 
sugar beets to meet the quota for sugar production. This result depends, in part, on our 
assumption that farmers would sow enough land to sugar beets to fulfill their quota. When we 
relax this assumption, both sugar beet area and yield dec! ine, leaving sugar production up to 
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13.5 percent below the quota level. Thus, production subsidies, input subsidies, or other 
production incentives will likely be necessary to avoid dec! ines in sugar beet yield, area, or 
production under the new policy. Without additional compensation, Turkish sugar beet 
producers will be worse off under the proposed policy change. Turkish consumers, however, 
will benefit from lower retail sugar prices. Assuming quotas are filled, Turkey is apt to 
become a small importer of sugar, most likely from the European Union, within the next 10 
years. 
Tariff Reduction Scenario 
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As an alternative to Turkey's integration into the Common Agricultural Policy's sugar 
regime, we analyze the impacts of accelerated tariff reduction under the current policy. 
Beginning in 2000, Turkey's tariff on imports of refined sugar is reduced 10 percent each year 
from 142.5 percent to 61.3 percent. Through the price linkage equation described in the 
discussion of the baseline results, Turkey's domestic sugar and sugar beet prices decline as the 
border price drops. The impact of changes in Turkish trade patterns on international sugar 
prices is simulated using the F APRI sugar model. The tariff reduction simulation results are 
presented in Table 7. 
As the sugar import tariff declines, domestic sugar and sugar beet prices fall farther 
below the baseline level. In 2000 sugar prices are 4.2 percent lower in the scenario than in the 
baseline, and the gap grows to 22 percent by 2007. Lower returns to sugar beet cultivation 
cause sugar beet area harvested to stagnate around 470 thousand hectares. Producers devote 
fewer resources to their sugar beet plantings, inducing yields to decline more than 10 percent 
below baseline levels. The combined effects of area and yield reductions leave sugar 
production nearly 25 percent lower than in the baseline by the end of the projection period. 
Consumers respond to lower sugar prices by increasing consumption an additional 62 tmt in 
2007. Consumer surplus grows 4.6 percent relative to the baseline by 2007 as a consequence 
of greater sugar consumption at lower prices. 
With domestic production declining and border prices falling, Turkish net sugar exports 
decline rapidly. In 2004 Turkey switches from a net exporter to a net importer of 253 tmt, and 
imports continue to grow at a rate of 36.1 percent annually until the end of the projection 
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period. Despite tariff reductions, revenues generated by import taxes exceed 5 trillion Turkish 
Lira by 2006. Adding 892 tmt of import demand to international sugar markets drives the 
London spot price for refined sugar up $39. 55/mt in 2007. The increase in international sugar 
prices helps counteract some of the negative impacts of liberalization on sugar producers in 
Turkey. Nevertheless, producer surplus declines more than 50 percent relative to the ba..<;eline 
by 2007. 
Our results indicate a much larger trade impact from Turkey's reduction of sugar tariffs 
than the study undertaken by the Southeastern Anatolia Project Administration (SAP, 1992). 
The SAP study utilized a world trade model to evaluate the impacts of full implementation of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) on agriculture. In the SAP baseline, Turkey was a net 
importer of 40 tmt of sugar in 2010. With full implementation of the URA, Turkey increased 
it<> imports marginally to 60 tmt. The present study indicates a much larger change in Turkey's 
net sugar trade because the assumed reduction in tariffs is significantly greater than in the SAP 
study, which only reduced sugar tariffs to 90.7 percent. The two studies use different methods 
for transmitting border price changes into the domestic market which may account for much of 
the disagreement about the impact of liberalization between the two. 
Conclusions 
The sugar market in Turkey has been heavily protected for decades, and the ba..<;eline 
projections in this paper indicate that the cost of protection is not likely to decline without 
policy reform. A recent trade agreement with the European Union and participation in the 
World Trade Organization are prompting the Turkish government to slowly begin the process 
of liberalization in this sector. At present it appears that the Turkish government has chosen to 
harmonize its sugar policy with the EU's sugar regime as part of its customs union agreement. 
Our analysis indicates that this shift in policy is apt to reduce returns to sugar beet producers, 
degrading their incentives to devote adequate resources to maintain yields. Depending on how 
producers respond to production quotas, the Turkish government may have to provide 
additional support to sugar beet farmers to maintain adequate domestic production to meet 
consumption needs. Consumers and the government may benefit from this policy change, 
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however, since consumer prices and budgetary outlays for subsided exports of excess 
production will both decline. 
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We also examine how simply reducing import tariffs under the current policy regime 
affects sugar production, consumption, and trade in Turkey. Not surprisingly, we find that 
Turkish producers are not competitive when exposed to greater pressure from the international 
market. Over a seven-year period, production drops off by nearly one-quarter relative to the 
baseline, and imports increase more than threefold. If tariffs are completely removed, domestic 
sugar production in Turkey can be expected to stabilize at a little over 1.1 mmt, about one-half 
the 1997 level, and imports will continue to rise with growth in domestic consumption. 
Our analysis, as in any simulation study, is conditioned on the underlying 
macroeconomic projections and other assumptions made in the process of constructing the 
model. Moreover, there are dynamic impacts of liberalization that cannot he captured in a 
partial equilibrium model like the one used in this study. It is possible that increased 
competition from producers outside Turkey will induce Turkish sugar producers to adopt more 
efficient production and management techniques, enabling them to remain viable in a liberalized 
market setting. However, without efficiency gains, our analysis suggests that Turkey will 
become increasingly dependent upon imported sugar as it continues to dismantle it<; system of 
protection. 
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Table 1. Estimated demand, area, yield, and net trade equations 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Per Capita Sugar Beet Sugar Beet Net Sugar 
Sugar Demand Area Yield Trade 
Intercept 17.77 5.91 7.52 -223.42 
(6.10) (7.0) (104.7) (-192) 
Real retail sugar price -141 
(-2.21) 
Real GDP per capita (at 1987 prices) 0.0095 
(5.73) 
Beginning sugar stock 0_5() 
( 4 65) 
Lagged sugar beet area [ t-3] 0.53 
(8. 7) 
Real sugar beet producer price [ t -1] 2.46 2.8484 
(3.6) (7.22) 
Real wheat producer price [t-3] -0.43 
( -3. I) 
Time trend 0.0048 
(3. 29) 
Dummy (D 1 = 1 for 1980, 1989 and 1994 ) -0.164 
( -6.56) 
Dummy (D= 1 for 1985 and 1988) -2.04 
(-2.21) 
Dummy (D 1 = 1 for 1988) 0.149 
(3 .46) 
Dummy (D=l for 1990 and 1995) -379.5 
(-3.55) 
Dummy (D=l for 1995) -0.26 
(-3.6) 
R2 0.76 0.89 0.88 0.89 
Durbin-Watson 1.81 1.87 
Durbin-h 0.24 0.68 
Rho! 0.65 
(3.18) 
Note: t value in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Estimated demand and supply elasticities 
Retail Sugar Price 
Per Capita Income 
Sugar Beet Price 
Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Wheat Producer Price 
Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Per Capita Demand 
-O.l.f 
0.49 
Sugar Beet Area 
0.42 
0.88 
-0.29 
-0.62 
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Sugar Beet Yield 
0.48 
Tahle 3: Baseline macroeconomic and exogenous variable assumptions 
'-
0\ 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Macroeconomic Variables Percentage Change 
Real GOP 7.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.1 5 '2 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
GOP Deflator 87.3 76.1 61.5 45.3 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Population 1.5 l.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 l.3 
Consumer Price Index 85.7 79.8 60.8 43.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 
Wholesale Price Index 81.8 82.7 60.6 42.1 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 31.0 
Dollar Exchange Rate 85.8 81.7 55.9 39.9 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 
Exogenous Variables U.S. Dollars per Metric Ton 
U.S. Wheat (FOB Gulf) 184 155 150 151 157 !59 160 162 164 166 171 
World Sugar Price (London) 315 305 304 306 307 308 310 313 316 318 319 
Percentage Change 
Sugar Beet Producer Price 150.0 64.5 49.8 46.0 33.3 30.9 30.4 30.5 31.3 30.9 30.9 
Retail Sugar Price (Crystal) 69.4 71.2 62.2 46.0 33.3 30.9 30.4 30.5 31.3 30.9 30.9 
Retail Sugar Price (Cube) 75.8 84.6 62.2 46.0 33.3 30.9 30.4 30.5 31.3 30.9 30 9 
Percent Ad Vc1orem ~ ~ 
;::, 
Sugar Import Tariff 144.0 144.0 142.5 141. () 139.5 138.0 136.5 135.0 135.0 135.0 135.0 ~ ~ 
~ 
.., 
Table 4: Baseline projections V:l 
1::: 
OQ 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 ;::, ..., 
'"tl 
Thousand Hectares 
2.. 
~· 
:::;, 
Area Harvested 445 443 452 455 473 520 513 518 543 539 542 ~ 0 
~ 
Metric Tons per Hectare ;:;· 
.... 
~ 
"" Sugar Beet Yield 41.4 43.8 41.9 40.1 41.0 41.7 41.9 42.0 42.0 42.3 42.5 :::;, 
{3 
1::: 
Thousand Metric Tons 2:: ;:;· 
Sugar Supply and Utilization ~ ~ 
Beginning Stocks 379 698 937 907 732 733 929 904 850 879 
..., 
:>;-
805 ·~ 
Production 2,222 2,382 2,315 2,221 2,372 2.651 2,622 2,659 2,791 2,789 2,812 
Consumption 1,946 2,008 2,074 2,143 2,216 2.298 2,381 2,460 2,541 2,624 2,711 
Net Exports -43 137 270 254 155 156 266 252 222 238 197 
Ending Stocks 698 937 907 732 733 929 904 850 879 805 709 
Prices Thousand Turkish Lira per Kilogram 
Sugar Beet Producer 11.0 18.1 27.1 39.6 52.7 69.0 90.1 117.5 154.3 202.0 264.5 
Sugar Retail (Crystal) 115.2 197.3 320.0 467.4 622.9 815.2 1.063.5 1,387.5 1,822.3 2,386.0 3.123.0 
Sugar Retail (Cube) 144.1 266.0 431.5 630.1 839.8 1.099 2 1.433.9 1.870.8 2.456.9 3,217.1 4.210.7 
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Table 5: Production 9uota scenario simulation results and percentage change from baseline 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Area Harvested Thousand Hectares 
Scenario 498 490 498 504 524 552 576 598 
Percentage Change 9.4 3.6 -4.2 -1.7 1.1 1.5 6.9 1 () .3 
Sugar Beet Yield Metric Tons per Hectare 
Scenario 40.1 37.8 37.9 37.6 37.6 37.5 37.5 37.6 
Percentage Change 0.0 -7.7 -9.1 -10.3 -10.5 -10.8 -114 -11.7 
Sugar Supply and Utilization 
Production 
Scenario 2,429 2,267 2,308 2,312 2,405 2.529 2.640 2,741 
Percentage Change 9.4 -4.4 -12.9 -11.8 -9.5 -9.4 -5 -~ -2.5 
Consumption 
Scenario 2,145 2,223 2,311 2,395 2.476 2,560 2,645 2.734 
Percentage Change 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Net Exports 
Scenario 254 271 143 61 -20 -49 -3 9 -20 
Percentage Change 0.0 74.6 -8.1 -77.0 -107.9 -122.1 -116.3 -1 l (). 2 
Ending Stocks 
Scenario 938 710 564 420 368 386 419 447 
Percentage Change 28.2 -3.1 -39.3 -53.6 -56.7 -56.1 -47.9 -37.0 
Prices 
Thousand Turkish Lira per Kilogram 
Sugar Beet Producer 
Scenario 35.0 45.7 58.5 75.9 98.5 127.8 166.6 216.2 
Percentage Change -11.5 -13.4 -15.2 -15.7 -16.2 -17.2 -17.5 -18.3 
Sugar Retail (Crystal) 
Scenario 464.2 605.4 775.7 1,006.5 1,305.9 1,694.4 2,208.5 2,865.5 
Percentage Change -D.7 -2.8 -4.8 -5.4 -5.9 -7.0 -7.4 -8.2 
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Table 6. Welfare and government cost measures and percentage change from the baseline 
2000 2001 2002 2003 200-l 2005 2006 2007 
EU Scenario 
Consumer Surplus Trillion 1996 Turkish Lira 
Scenario 354.5 375.8 400.5 424.2 447.1 471.3 496.6 523.9 
Percentage Change 0.2 0.7 1.2 1.2 Ll !.5 I 6 1.7 
Producer Surplus 
Scenario 22.0 21.5 21.7 21.8 21.3 21.2 21.3 21.2 
Percentage Change -23.2 -30.9 -36.9 -35.4 -37.3 -41.1 -40 7 -41.2 
Tariff Revenue/Subsidy Cost 
Scenario -5.3 -5.6 -2 9 -1.2 0.3 0 8 0.7 0.3 
Baseline -5.4 -3.4 -]. -l -5.7 -5.4 -4.7 -5.0 -4 l 
Percentage Change -1.1 GG 6 -15 ] -79 () -I 06.4 -I! 7.7 -112.9 -108 () 
Tariff Reduction Scenario 
Consumer Surplus 
Scenario 357.6 381.3 407.1 432.6 454.4 483.0 506.2 538.7 
Percentage Change 1.0 2.2 2.8 3.3 3.0 4.1 3.5 4 (J 
Producer Surplus 
Scenario 25.9 24.5 24.2 21.9 22.1 19.7 20.4 17 () 
Percentage Change -9.4 -21.4 -29.6 -35.0 -35.0 -45.2 -43.2 -53 0 
Tariff Revenue/Subsidy Cost 
Scenario -5.0 -2.8 -1.2 -0.7 3.0 3.3 5.7 5.4 
Baseline -5.4 -3.4 -3.4 -5.7 -5.4 -4.7 -5.0 --4 .I 
Percentage Change -6.9 -17.8 -64.9 -87.1 -156.6 -170.8 -213.9 -229.2 
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Table 7: Tariff reduction scenario simulation results and percentage change from the baseline 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
A rca Harvested Thousand Hectares 
Scenario 455 461 493 477 469 487 464 464 
Percentage Change 0.0 -2.5 -5.3 -7.0 -9.5 -10.4 -14.0 -14.3 
Sugar Beet Yield Metric Tons per Hectare 
Scenario 40.1 39.8 39.2 38.5 38.0 38.3 37.1 37.8 
Percentage Change 0.0 -2.9 -6.1 -8.0 -9.5 -9.0 -12.3 -11.1 
Sugar Supply and Utilization 
Production 
Scenario 2,221 2,246 2,358 2,243 2,178 2,277 2,104 2,145 
Percentage Change 0.0 -5.3 -110 -14.5 -18.1 -18.4 -24.6 -23.7 
Consumption 
Scenario 2,154 2,240 2,330 2,419 2,496 2.592 2,670 2.773 
Percentage Change 0.5 1. 1 14 16 1.5 2.0 18 2.1 
Net Exports 
Scenario 254 149 69 46 -253 -324 -575 -638 
Percentage Change 0.0 -4.0 -55.9 -82.8 -200.3 -245.9 -3415 -424.7 
Ending Stocks 
Scenario 721 578 537 315 250 259 267 277 
Percentage Change -1.5 -21.2 -42.2 -65.2 -70.6 -70.5 -66.8 -60.9 
Prices Tiwusand Turkish Lira per Kilogram 
Sugar Beet Producer 
Scenario 37.9 48.1 60.9 77.4 101.9 125.8 168.6 206.3 
Percentage Change -4.2 -8.8 -118 -14.1 -13.3 -18.5 -16.6 -22.0 
Sugar Retail (Crystal) 
Scenario 447.7 568.0 719.1 913.8 1,203.1 U85.5 1,990.7 2,436.6 
Percentage Change -4.2 -8.8 -118 -14.1 -13.3 -18.5 -16.6 -22.0 
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ENDNOTES 
I. Price linkage equations were estimated from historical price data. Regression result may be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
2. Since the sugar refining sector is not explicitly modeled, producer surplus docs not include 
surplus accruing to the sugar processing sector. The producer surplus measure in Table 6 is 
calculated as total revenue less the area under the sugar beet supply curve. 
3 Historic yields fall within 5.5 percent on either side ofthe 5-year average y1cld with 95 
percent confidence. 
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